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Introduction
Home ownership has long been identified as 
a central element of the “American Dream”; 
in fact, many treat the two as synonymous. 
No wonder, then, that much of federal anti-
discrimination law focuses on housing and the
lending markets used to finance home pur-
chases. For more than 30 years, bank regula-
tors have been charged with the task of rooting
out illegal discrimination in credit markets.
The long-standing debate over whether
lenders systematically discriminate against
minorities received added momentum in 1992
with the release of the now-famous “Boston
Fed Study” (Munnell et al. [1992]), which pur-
ported to find that minority applicants in the
Boston area are roughly half again as likely as
similarly situated white applicants to be denied
mortgage loans. Although their conclusions
have been hotly debated in the ensuing years,
there can be no question that Munnell et al. put
the mortgage discrimination debate on the front
burner in both policy and academic circles. 
This debate still rages today. Yet after more
than six years, we are not much closer to
knowing whether discrimination is a wide-
spread problem in mortgage markets. Indeed,
economists have yet to agree on whether it is
more effective to detect discrimination using
denial rate analyses like those employed by
Munnell et al. or by examining borrower de-
fault rates. Nor have we settled on the appro-
priate policy response to make if discrimination
is in fact as prevalent as Munnell et al. suggest.
A key roadblock in answering these ques-
tions has been the lack of a solid theoretical
foundation on which to conduct the debate.
Without a consistent economic theory of the
mortgage application, underwriting, and default
processes, fundamental tasks such as defining
discrimination and outlining how it might be
detected have proven slippery. As a conse-
quence, more advanced issues such as identify-
ing the source of discrimination and evaluating
potential policy responses have been obviated,
despite longstanding calls to “move beyond a
debate over whether discrimination exists to a
discussion of how best to eradicate it” (Galster,
[1993, p. 146]).
In this article, we outline a simple theoretical
model of the mortgage underwriting process,
originally developed by Longhofer and Peters
(1999), which provides a framework for clearly
defining discrimination and various notions of
the default rate. By giving those with differing
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positions, this model clarifies and reconciles
some of the most contentious questions at the
heart of the controversy over mortgage discrim-
ination. We also show how this theoretical
foundation can aid in designing practical policy
responses to this vexing social problem.
The next section reviews the highlights of
the debate that ensued in the wake of the initial
study by Munnell et al. Section II introduces the
Longhofer–Peters model of mortgage under-
writing and shows how it can be used to clarify
many of the definitions and assumptions that
underlie this debate. Section III reexamines the
mortgage discrimination debate in light of that




The debate over whether lenders systemically
discriminate against minority applicants began
in earnest with the release of Munnell et al.
(1992).1  The authors of this study found that
minority applicants in the Boston metropolitan
area were approximately 50 percent more
likely to be rejected than whites, even after
controlling for the factors that banks use to de-
termine an applicant’s creditworthiness. “This
means that 17 percent of black or Hispanic ap-
plicants instead of 11 percent would be denied
loans, even if they had the same obligation
ratios, credit history, loan to value, and prop-
erty characteristics as white applicants. In short,
the results indicate that a serious problem exists
in the market for mortgage loans, and lenders,
community groups, and regulators must work
together to ensure that minorities are treated
fairly” (Munnell et al. [1992, p. 44]).
In his Nobel Lecture, Becker (1993b) chal-
lenges these findings. Recasting his economic
theory of discrimination in the context of the
mortgage lending market, Becker argues that
bigoted lenders are willing to sacrifice the profit
they might earn by approving marginally quali-
fied minority applicants in order to satisfy their
“tastes for discrimination.” Thus, the proper way
to detect discrimination is to do so directly, by
comparing the relative profitability of loans to
minorities and whites: “This requires examining
the default and other payback experiences of
loans, the interest rates charged, and so forth. If
banks discriminate against minority applicants,
they should earn greater profits on the loans
actually made to them than on those to whites.
The reason is that discriminating banks would
3
be willing to accept marginally profitable white
applicants” (Becker [1993b, p. 389]). 
If banks discriminate against minority bor-
rowers, Becker argues, we should observe
minorities defaulting less frequently than whites
on average. “[T]he theory of discrimination con-
tains the paradox that the rate of default on
loans approved for blacks and Hispanics by
discriminatory banks should be lower, not
higher, than those on mortgage loans to whites.
The reason is that such banks only accept the
very best minority candidates” (Becker [1993a]).
Because discriminators who are following their
tastes will pass up better-qualified minority ap-
plicants for less-qualified white ones, the aver-
age creditworthiness of the minorities who
actually receive loans will be higher than that
of whites.
Macey (1994) uses Becker’s argument to re-
fute the principal conclusions of Munnell et al.,
citing that study’s own data.2  “The default rates
for white and black mortgage loan applications
are equal across census tracts. If bankers were
discriminating by turning down marginally qual-
ified black applicants while accepting margin-
ally qualified white applicants, then default rates
among whites would be higher. But bankers are
accepting the same level of risk from both black
and white applicants” (Macey [1994]).
The validity of this argument regarding aver-
age default rates relies on the assumption that
white and minority credit risk is equally distrib-
uted in the borrower pool. In fact, however,
Munnell et al.’s data suggest that minority ap-
plicants (and borrowers) are less creditworthy
than whites on average (see Munnell et al.
[1996], table 1).
Galster (1993) uses this fact to argue that
minorities will default more often than whites
in the absence of discrimination. Thus, he con-
cludes that equal average default rates across
minority and white borrower pools imply taste-
based discrimination against minorities. On
these grounds, Galster suggests that default
rates cannot be considered a reliable indicator
of discrimination.3
The above arguments revolve around
whether average default rates can be used to
uncover discriminatory behavior on the part of
lenders. Others, including Calomiris et al. (1994)
n 1 Later revised and published as Munnell et al. (1996).
n 2 See also Brimelow and Spencer (1993) and Becker (1993a).  
n 3 Tootell (1993), Browne and Tootell (1995), and Munnell et al.
(1996) echo Galster’s conclusions.
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and Ferguson and Peters (1995) focus on the
interpretation of marginal default rates. These
authors argue that, regardless of the relative dis-
tributions of creditworthiness across racial
groups, in the absence of taste-based discrimi-
nation the marginal borrower—the least credit-
worthy applicant to be approved for a loan—
will have the same creditworthiness across
groups. That is, if banks hold all applicants to
the same credit standard, the marginal default
rate will be the same for all racial groups. If this
is true, then comparisons of the marginal default
rate across races may enable regulators to detect
taste-based  discrimination (in the manner of
Becker [1993b]).
In summary, a variety of apparently conflict-
ing tests have been proposed for inferring
whether lenders discriminate against minority
applicants: Lower average default rates for mi-
norities are evidence of discrimination against
minorities (for example, Becker [1993b]); equal
average default rates for minorities and whites
are evidence of discrimination against minori-
ties (Galster [1993]); and, lower marginal minor-
ity default rates are evidence of discrimination
against minorities (Calomiris et al. [1994]).
Which of these conclusions are we to believe?
How should we go about uncovering illegal
discrimination? In the next section, we develop





In order to define what constitutes discrimina-
tion and determine how such behavior might
be detected, we must first understand how
mortgage applications are underwritten. To do
this, we use the mortgage underwriting model
developed in Longhofer and Peters (1999). 
Consider a world in which individuals want
to buy a house, but lack sufficient funds to do
so. As a result, they must obtain loans from a
financial institution, which we will call a “bank.”
Individuals in this world are distinguished by
two characteristics. The first is the likelihood
with which they repay their loans, which we
denote by q Î [0,1]. The second is their mem-
bership in one of two “groups,” A or B. For ease
of exposition, we will often refer to group A as
the “white” group and to group B as the “minor-
ity” group. It should be clear, however, that
these groups may alternatively be thought of as
distinguishing individuals according to any pub-
licly observable characteristic over which fair-
lending laws might prohibit discrimination.
Let gA(q) represent the density of creditwor-
thiness in the group A applicant pool and
gB(q) represent the corresponding density for
members of group B. It is important to note
that these two densities generally will differ
from one another.4  We assume that both gA(q)
and gB(q) are known to all banks. 
Based on their costs of funds and the com-
petitive interest rate in the market, banks deter-
mine a q * defining the minimum acceptable
creditworthiness they are willing to approve. In
a full-information world, lenders would know
each individual’s true q and would approve
only those applicants with q ³q *. Unfortu-
nately, lenders cannot perfectly observe q, but
instead observe a signal s that is correlated with
q. This signal can be thought of as a summary
of all the information a lender collects on a loan
application, including the applicant’s current
income ratios and past credit history, the char-
acteristics of the subject property, and so on.5
Let p(s½q) denote the likelihood that a
lender observes signal s from an applicant of
type q.6  Using this signal generation process
and the distribution of creditworthiness in the
applicant pool, lenders derive an estimate of an
applicant’s expected creditworthiness, given his
signal. We will often refer to this expected
creditworthiness as an applicant’s inferred
“quality,” which is denoted by
(1) qi(s) = òq  p(s½q )gi(q) dq, i = A, B
where wi(s) =òTi p(s½q)gi(q)dq, i = A, B, is the
density of signals received from members of
group i, and Ti is the set of group i applicants
that apply for loans: {q ½gi(q) > 0}. 
Expression (1) makes it clear that an appli-
cant’s inferred quality is simply his expected
creditworthiness, where this expectation is tak-
en over the lender’s (Bayesian) posterior beliefs
about the applicant’s creditworthiness. Clearly,
Ti wi(s)
n 4 Longhofer and Peters (1999) analyze how individual self-selection
can lead to endogenous differences in credit risk across groups. Alterna-
tively, one could imagine that the distributions of credit risk in the underly-
ing population differs across groups, leading to differences in these densi-
ties for the group applicant pools even in the absence of self-selection (see,
for example, Calem and Stutzer [1995]).
n 5 Although an applicant’s q is assumed to be private information,
the group to which he belongs can be costlessly observed by lenders, giv-
ing them an opportunity to discriminate on this basis if they so choose.
n 6 Although we assume  that this signal generation process is the
same for members of both groups, one could imagine a world in which it
differed. Such a difference in p(s½ q) across groups lies at the heart of the
cultural affinity hypothesis proposed by Calomiris et al. (1994).
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this posterior will be determined by both the
distribution of credit risk in the overall applicant
pool and the specific signal sent by the appli-
cant. Given these beliefs, a lender will approve
an applicant if and only if q(s) ³ q* º q*.
Longhofer and Peters (1999) show that an
applicant’s inferred creditworthiness is increas-
ing in his signal. That is, q ¢(s) > 0, confirming
the intuition that applicants who send better sig-
nals tend to be more creditworthy. More impor-
tantly, this result assures us that there exists a
unique cutoff signal, s *, such that all applicants
sending signals better than s * are approved
while those sending worse signals are not.
Defining 
Discrimination
The most striking omission in the debate over
mortgage discrimination has been the lack of a
formal definition of what behavior actually con-
stitutes “discrimination.” Perhaps this should
not be surprising, given that the term is not
defined in either the Equal Credit Opportunity
Act or the Fair Housing Act—the two laws that
directly prohibit discriminatory practices in the
mortgage underwriting process. Presumably,
this omission indicates Congress’ belief that
clarification would be superfluous because the
meaning of the term is well understood by all
reasonable people.
In our opinion, however, much of the con-
troversy over how best to detect discrimination
arises precisely because of differing implicit
definitions of this central concept. To clarify the
law’s intent, we turn to Merriam Webster’s Col-
legiate Dictionary, 10th ed., which defines dis-
crimination as “the act, practice, or an instance
of discriminating [making a distinction] categor-
ically rather than individually.” In other words,
any difference in treatment across individuals
based solely on group membership—rather
than on personal characteristics specifically re-
lated to the performance of the loan—would
constitute discriminatory behavior under the
law. It is our interpretation (and the practice of
the major bank regulators) that such a definition
precludes lenders from applying group-specific
underwriting standards, even if group member-
ship is correlated with loan performance.7
Consistent with this idea, consider the
following:
Definition: A lender is said to discriminate
against minority applicants if it
requires them to meet a more strin-
gent underwriting standard than it
does white applicants; i.e., if sB * > sA * . 
When discrimination is explicitly defined in
this way, it becomes clear that lenders’ incen-
tives to discriminate can arise for two distinct
reasons. First, lenders may have Beckerian
“tastes for discrimination,” bigoted preferences
that would manifest themselves through differ-
ences in the q* required from members of each
group. In other words, we say that a lender
exhibits bigoted preferences if  qB * > qA * . This
source of discrimination is depicted in figure 1,
which assumes that qA(s) = qB(s) for every s.8
In this case, the monotonicity of q implies that
a bigoted lender will have an incentive to dis-
criminate against members of group B by set-
ting sB * > sA *.
Even without such tastes for discrimination,
however, lenders may still have an incentive to
discriminate if the overall pool of minority
applicants is less creditworthy on average than
the white applicant pool. In other words, if the
minority applicant pool consists of relatively
more low-q individuals, qA(s) will lie above
qB(s) for every s, giving banks an incentive for
statistical discrimination.9
F I G U R E 1
Taste-Based 
Discrimination (Bigotry)
n 7 A noteworthy exception is the Equal Credit Opportunity Act, which
specifically allows age to be considered in credit-scoring models, but only
if it is to the advantage of older applicants.
n 8 This requires that the distribution of credit risk, g(q), be the same
across the two applicant pools.
n 9 Strictly speaking, it is only necessary that qA(s) > qB(s) for 
s < sB
*;Longhofer and Peters (1999) present a case in which statistical
discrimination arises and yet qA(s) < qB(s) for large s.
Bigoted lenders act on a taste for discrimination by holding minority applicants
to a higher creditworthiness threshold (q *
A < q *
B ). This implies that bigoted
lenders will hold minorities to a more stringent underwriting standard than they
do whites (s*
A < s * *
B ).
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Statistical discrimination is depicted by
figure 2, in which lenders set the same mini-
mum creditworthiness standard for both white
and minority applicants. Nevertheless, because
minority applicants are less creditworthy (have
lower qs) on average, lenders believe that a
minority applicant sending any signal s is less
creditworthy than a white applicant sending the
same signal. Put another way, given the distrib-
ution of credit risk in their applicant pools,
lenders know that a minority applicant sending
any signal s is more likely to default than a
white applicant sending the same signal. As a
result, lenders have an incentive to hold minor-
ity applicants to a higher s*.
Of course, these beliefs do not arise in a
vacuum. As long as lenders accurately estimate
the distribution of credit risk in their applicant
pools, gi(q), the probability that a group i ap-
plicant repays his loan is qi(s). Thus, lenders
that statistically discriminate find their beliefs
validated ex post; on average, minority borrow-
ers sending signal sB * repay their loans at ex-
actly the same rate as white borrowers sending
signal sA *, and both repay at the minimum rate
acceptable to the bank.
Defining 
Default Rates
Given the above discussion, we can now define
and analyze the different notions of default rates
that have arisen in the mortgage discrimination
controversy. As it turns out, participants in the
debate rarely use the most useful of these no-
tions, the conditional default rate.
Definition: The conditional default rate for
members of group i is the fraction of
group i borrowers that actually de-
fault, conditional on their signal s:
di(s) º 1 – qi(s), i = A, B. 
As discussed above, the likelihood that a
group i borrower with signal s will end up
defaulting on his loan is 1 – qi(s). If there is a
sufficiently large population of borrowers, then
the actual fraction of group i borrowers send-
ing signal s that default will be di(s). From a
lender’s perspective, this conditional default
rate is what matters most. After all, the lender’s
underwriting decision is ultimately determined
by the likelihood that an applicant will default,
given the information on his application. This is
exactly what di(s) measures.
Most of the mortgage discrimination debate,
however, has focused on other notions of
default rates. 
Definition: The average default rate is the
fraction of all borrowers who
actually default on their loans: 
(2) di º ò di(s) wi(s) ds, i = A, B.
Thus, the average default rate is simply the
weighted average of the conditional default
rates of individuals who were approved, where
the weights are determined by the distribution
of signals sent by approved applicants. 
Finally, Berkovec et al. (1994), Calomiris et
al. (1994), and Ferguson and Peters (1997, 1998)
all consider varying notions of the “marginal”
rate of default (or denial). Unfortunately, this
concept has often been somewhat ill-defined.10
It can be most precisely defined as follows:
Definition: The marginal default rate is the
fraction of defaulters among the bor-
rowers sending the lowest approved
signal: dm
i º di(s*) = 1 – qi(s*), 
i = A, B.
F I G U R E 2
Statistical Discrimination






If minority applicants are less creditworthy on average than whites, this will be
reflected in the lender’s assessment of an applicant’s inferred quality. Thus, qA(s)
will lie above qB(s). In this case, even if lenders hold white and minority appli-
cants to the same credit standard, q*
A = q *
B, they will have an incentive to statisti-
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In the context of our model, the notion of a
marginal default rate may be easily understood.
In the real world, however, it is virtually impos-
sible for regulators to identify the unique cut-
off signal s* used by lenders.11 As a practical
matter, then, the marginal default rate is often
taken as either the average or the conditional
default rate among borrowers sending signals
below some arbitrary threshold. For example,
Berkovec et al. (1994) analyze conditional
default rates among FHA borrowers, under the
presumption that they are riskier than those
obtaining conventional loans; the authors fur-
ther attempt to focus on “marginal” borrowers
by dividing their sample into risk quartiles,
comparing conditional default rates across
white and minority borrowers in each quartile.
III. Deciphering 
the Debate
In section II, we introduced a simple theoretical
model of the mortgage underwriting process
and used it to help define discrimination and
various notions of the default rate. In the pre-
sent section, we use these definitions to recon-
sider the various arguments outlined in section I.
In particular, we analyze the accuracy and the
consistency of these arguments and consider
why this debate has been so difficult to resolve.
Finally, we discuss how our model’s formal
structure can be used to develop a better
understanding of the underlying causes of any
discrimination that does exist in the mortgage
market. As we will argue, understanding the
root causes of the problem is essential to
designing effective policy responses. 
The Default Rate
Controversy
We begin by imagining a world where credit
risk is identically distributed in both the minor-
ity and white applicant pools; that is, gA(q ) =
gB(q ), "q . In such a world, the only possible
source of discrimination is bigotry, which mani-
fests itself as a higher required standard of
creditworthiness for minorities (qB * >qA *). As
shown in figure 1, lenders with such a taste for
discrimination will respond by setting sB * > sA *.
Nevertheless, the fact that gA(q) = gB(q), "q
implies that the inferred creditworthiness of a
white applicant and a minority applicant, each
of whom sends the same signal s, will be iden-
tical; that is qA(s) = qB(s), "s. Thus, conditional
default rates will be the same across the two
groups. But if conditional default rates are the
same across groups, the average default rates of
the two groups must diverge whenever banks
set sB * > sA *; that is, dA > dB. Put another way, if
minority and white borrowers are equally cred-
itworthy on average, then any difference in the
average default rate across groups must arise
from lenders’ tastes for discrimination. 
This idea is shown graphically in figure 3,
in which conditional default rates are identical
across the two groups. Because qB * > qA *, how-
ever, lenders set sB * > sA *, implying that white
applicants with s Î [sA*, sB*] are approved, while
minority applicants sending the same signals
are not. Ex post, these borrowers are the least
creditworthy and hence the most likely to
default. Because these applicants are excluded
from the minority borrower pool, the average
default rate of minorities who are actually
approved for loans must be lower than that 
of whites.
Pursuing this logic, Becker (1993a), Brimelow
and Spencer (1993), and Macey (1994) claim
that Munnell et al.’s own data refute a conclu-
sion of discrimination. After all, they argue,
default rates across census tracts do not appear
to be systematically related to the percentage of
minorities residing in those tracts. While not
conclusive, this evidence seems inconsistent
with the notion that minorities default more fre-
quently on average than whites.
F I G U R E 3
Default Rates under Bigotry
If credit risk is identically distributed across the minority and white applicant
pools, bigoted lenders will require minority applicants to meet a more stringent
underwriting standard (a higher s*). Because the minority applicants who are
rejected are those with the highest default risk, the average default rate will be
lower for minorities than it will be for whites.
n 11 For a discussion of how this model relates to econometric
analyses of s* by regulators and researchers, see Craig et al. (1998).
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Given their assumptions, Becker (1993a),
Brimelow and Spencer (1993), and Macey
(1994) are all correct in their conclusions. In
our model, however, it is clear that for a group
of borrowers, the average default rate depends
not only on the underwriting standard applied
to that group, but also on the distribution of
signals sent by those borrowers, wi(s). This, in
turn, depends on the distribution of credit risk
in the group’s applicant pool. Thus, ex ante dif-
ferences in credit risk across applicant pools
can lead to ex post differences in observed
average default rates, even in the absence of
discrimination.
This is the essential point made by Tootell
(1993) and Galster (1993). They argue that
Munnell et al.’s data verify that minority appli-
cants are less creditworthy on average than their
white counterparts.12 This stylized fact is illus-
trated in figure 4, where gB(q) is shifted slightly
to the left of gA(q).13 In the context of our mod-
el, such differences in credit risk across groups
cause lenders to adjust their assessment of an
applicant’s inferred quality, so that qA(s) > qB(s),
"s. As a result, if lenders were to hold both
groups to the same s*, the average default rate
would be lower for white applicants. On the
other hand, if lenders do set s*
A < s*
B, then the
relative average default rate between the two
groups will be ambiguous (see figure 5).
Thus we see that, if lenders are bigoted,
there are two counteracting effects on minority
default rates: the bigotry effect and lower aver-
age minority creditworthiness. On the one
hand, lender tastes for discrimination imply that
relatively more of the less-creditworthy white
borrowers get included when calculating dA.
On the other hand, for any given s, a minor-
ity borrower is more likely to default than a
white borrower. Which of these two effects will
dominate in practice is unclear.14  As a result,
Tootell and Galster both argue, average default
rates cannot be used to disprove a charge of
discrimination. In fact, if minority borrowers are
less creditworthy on average than their white
counterparts, a finding that both groups default
at the same rate could only be consistent with
lenders acting on bigotry against minorities. 
Even though average default rates cannot
disprove the existence of discrimination, other
notions of the default rate may still be useful.
The essential problem with average default
rates is that they incorporate too much informa-
tion. In contrast, conditional and marginal
default rates focus on a specific subset of bor-
rowers, making it easier to interpret what lies
behind any differences across groups. 
At its core, Becker’s argument is driven by
the fact that, if lenders hold minorities to a
more stringent underwriting standard arising





F I G U R E 4
Differences in Underlying
Creditworthiness across Groups
F I G U R E 5
Statistical Discrimination
and Default Rates
If minority applicants are less creditworthy on average than white applicants, the
density of credit risk in the minority applicant pool will lie to the left of the den-
sity for the white applicant pool.
If minority applicants are less creditworthy than their white counterparts on
average, lenders will have an incentive to statistically discriminate against them,
even in the absence of bigotry. They do so by choosing s *
A and sB* so as to
equalize the inferred quality of the last applicant approved from each group 
[qA(s*
A) = qB*(sB*)]. This in turn implies that the marginal default rate of the two
groups will be identical. However, the relative average default rates will be
ambiguous.
n 12 The Federal Reserve’s National Surveys of Consumer Finances
also support this conclusion.  
n 13 Formally, one can think of the cumulative distribution function
of credit risk in the white applicant pool, GA(q), as being first-order sto-
chastic dominant over GB(q), the cumulative distribution of credit risk in
the minority applicant pool; see Ferguson and Peters (1995).
n 14 In addition, the distribution of signals, w(s), will differ across
groups, further complicating this calculation.
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(that is, the one with the lowest approved sig-
nal) will be more creditworthy than the mar-
ginal white borrower (see figure 3). In contrast,
if lenders practice statistical discrimination, they
do so precisely because they wish to ensure
that the marginal white and marginal minority
borrowers are equally creditworthy. In other
words, statistical discrimination arises when
lenders try to offset differences in the overall
applicant pools across races (see figure 5).
Thus, when we focus on marginal default rates,
we see that Becker’s argument remains valid,
even in the presence of differential creditwor-
thiness across racial groups.15
Unfortunately, regulators and econometri-
cians cannot precisely observe a borrower’s
actual signal, nor can they pin down a lender’s
true underwriting guidelines. Thus, identifying
the marginal borrower from each group is a
practical impossibility. One way around this
problem is to examine the default risk within a
subset of borrowers whose creditworthiness is
below some arbitrary threshold, as in Berkovec
et al. (1994). Using a sample of FHA borrowers,
they find that minorities in the highest-risk
quartile have a significantly higher conditional
default rate than do whites in the same risk
class.16  If we generically treat all borrowers in
this risk class as “marginal,” the results of
Berkovec et al. would appear to suggest that
statistical discrimination is the best explanation
for those of Munnell et al. 
Table 1 summarizes the default-rate implica-
tions discussed in this section. In a world in
which members of both groups are equally
creditworthy on average, conditional default
rates will likewise be the same across groups
[dA(s) = dB(s),"s]. In this case, if lenders exhibit
tastes for discrimination the default rate of the
marginal minority borrower will be lower than
that of the marginal white borrower [dA(sA *) >
dB(sB *)], causing the average default rate of
minority borrowers to be lower than that of
whites (dA > dB).
In contrast, when lenders have an incentive
to statistically discriminate, minorities’ condi-
tional default rate will be higher than that of
whites [dA(s) < dB(s),"s]; average default rates
will be ambiguous. Nevertheless, lenders acting
solely on a profit motive will discriminate
against minorities only to the extent necessary
to equalize the marginal default rate of mem-
bers of each group [dA(sA *) = dB(sB *)]. 
Finally, when lenders act on both statistical
and taste-based motives, conditional default
rates will continue to be higher for minorities
[dA(s) < dB(s),"s]. Interestingly, however,
lender bigotry will cause the default rate of the
marginal minority borrower to fall below that of
the marginal white borrower [dA(sA *) > dB(sB *)],
despite the higher conditional default rates for
minority borrowers.
It is important to note that while conditional
default rates may be useful in determining
whether lenders have an incentive to discrimi-
nate, they cannot be used to determine whether
lenders actually act on this incentive. Condi-
tional default rates across groups will diverge
whenever minority borrowers on average are
substantially less creditworthy than white bor-
rowers. This will be true whether or not lenders
actually require minorities to meet a higher
underwriting threshold, s*. Thus, we must rely
on denial rate analyses such as Munnell et al. to
uncover discrimination and use default rate
information to help determine the underlying
source, if discrimination is determined to exist;




Taken together, Munnell et al.’s denial rate find-
ings and Berkovec et al.’s default rate results
pose a puzzle: How can marginal minority bor-
rowers be significantly more likely to default
than their white counterparts, yet still be less
likely to be approved in the first place?
T A B L E 1
Relative Default Rates 















default rates dA > dB dA ³ £ dB dA ³ £ dB
n 15 This point was made by Calomiris et al. (1994).
n 16 Although Berkovec et al. do control for numerous property and
personal characteristics, an important limitation of their analysis is that
their data do not contain any information on individual credit histories.
The authors attempt to correct for any bias resulting from this omission,
and still conclude that marginal minority borrowers default at a signifi-
cantly higher rate than do whites.
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The answer is statistical discrimination. In
contrast to the taste-based discrimination consid-
ered by Becker, statistical discrimination is based
on lenders’ beliefs about applicant creditworthi-
ness. Calomiris et al. (1994), Calem and Stutzer
(1995) and Longhofer and Peters (1999) each
show that statistical discrimination can occur if
lenders’ beliefs about creditworthiness differ
across groups.17 For example, Longhofer and
Peters (1999) show that if a lender believes that
minority applicants’ average creditworthiness is
lower than that of white applicants, then minor-
ity applicants will have to clear a higher hurdle
—that is, minorities will be required to have
better applications than whites—in order to re-
ceive a loan. Thus, although the inferred credit-
worthiness (the posterior assessment of cred-
itworthiness) of white and minority borrowers is
the same at the margin, econometric tests that
use a borrower’s application information (the
signal) to proxy for his true creditworthiness will
find that minorities default more often.
Although statistical discrimination provides a
straightforward, plausible resolution of the
results of Munnell et al. and Berkovec et al.,
many economists appear to be uncomfortable
with this explanation. In fact, they seem to
operate under the assumption that statistical
discrimination is not, or should not be, illegal. 
Where would such an assumption come
from? Current law permits lenders to include
most any underwriting variable that is demon-
strably related to the profitability of a loan.18
For example, lenders may consider an appli-
cant’s past credit history, even though this vari-
able is highly correlated with race, because it is
also strongly associated with an applicant’s like-
lihood of repaying the loan. On the basis of
this observation, it is reasonable to conclude
that the proper scope of fair-lending law is to
prohibit discrimination that arises for motives
that are not profit-based, that is, from bigotry. 
For example, Becker and Macey’s focus on
average default rates would seem rather mis-
placed, considering that average minority cre-
ditworthiness is lower than average white
creditworthiness. Such a focus is perfectly rea-
sonable, however, if one believes that statisti-
cal discrimination is not, in fact, discrimination
at all. We are also struck by the lengths to
which Munnell et al. go to reject the notion
that their findings are driven by statistical
discrimination: “The dearth of any evidence that
minorities default more frequently, given their
economic fundamentals, makes a conclusion of
economically rational [statistical] discrimination
problematic” (Munnell et al., [1996, p. 45]).
As we’ve already argued, however, existing
fair-lending laws appear to prohibit both taste-
based and statistical discrimination implicitly.
Indeed, if statistical discrimination were permis-
sible, lenders could simply include race as a
variable in a statistically verified credit-scoring
model; as long as the race variable showed a
statistically significant impact on the loan’s
overall profitability, it would be permissible to
consider race under such an interpretation of
the law. Of course, this is expressly illegal. Fur-
thermore, the “disparate impact test” in fair-
lending enforcement effectively precludes the
use of underwriting variables that themselves
have no information content, but rather serve
as proxies for race.
This discussion highlights why it is so impor-
tant to confront issues like mortgage discrimi-
nation with a sound theoretical model. In the
context of our formal model of the mortgage
underwriting process, the definition of discrimi-
nation and the proper way of measuring it
become clear. When both statistical discrimina-
tion and bigotry can result in differences in s *
across groups, the question of whether default
rates can be used to detect discrimination
becomes largely irrelevant.
This is not to suggest, however, that default
rates are useless in the mortgage discrimination
debate. In fact, one of the most important
questions is how best to respond to any dis-
crimination that does exist in the mortgage




Although borrower default rates are poorly
suited for determining whether or not lenders
discriminate against minority applicants, they
can be useful in determining what incentives lie
at the root of any discrimination that is uncov-
ered. In other words, default rates may provide
a means of distinguishing between statistical
discrimination and bigotry. 
It is worth asking why we are interested in
identifying the source of mortgage market dis-
crimination. After all, we have argued that this
distinction is not important under the law. Nor
is the root cause of discrimination likely to
interest an individual victim. From a policy-
n 17 Arrow (1972a, 1972b) and Phelps (1972) offer the first discus-
sion of statistical discrimination; they do so in the context of labor markets.
n 18 Such variables must pass the “disparate impact test,” as we dis-
cuss below. See the Federal Financial Institution Examination Council’s
1994 joint statement on fair-lending enforcement.
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maker’s perspective, however, it is quite impor-
tant to know whether discrimination is belief-
based or preference-based. Any policy’s ability
to eradicate discrimination will depend on the
underlying source of that discrimination.19
For example, an appropriately designed
penalty/subsidy scheme might counteract a big-
oted lender’s willingness to forgo profitable
opportunities for lending to minority applicants,
thereby inducing it to equalize its required qA *
and qB
*.20 Alternatively (and perhaps more
effectively), policymakers may attempt to com-
bat taste-based discrimination by promoting
competition in the mortgage market.
While these kinds of policies may work to
eliminate bigotry, they can have the opposite
effect on a statistical discriminator. Eradication
of belief-based discrimination hinges on a pol-
icy’s ability to make profit-maximizing lenders
ignore costless information (the correlation
between race and default) that, if used, would
improve their profitability. Increased competi-
tion strengthens a lender’s desire to employ
such information, effectively increasing its
incentives to statistically discriminate. Instead,
statistical discrimination is best fought by focus-
ing directly on the underlying source of differ-
ences across groups. 
Likewise, penalty/subsidy schemes (much
like the current use of the CRA as a tool for fair-
lending enforcement) may be less desirable
when the true source of discrimination is statis-
tical correlation between race and creditworthi-
ness. Although such a scheme may well
enhance minorities’ access to credit, it will do
so at a very large cost: By making mortgage
loans more attractive to less-creditworthy
minority applicants, a penalty/subsidy solution
would reduce the average creditworthiness of
the applicant pool, strengthening the correla-
tion between race and default. As a result, even
larger subsidies or penalties would be required
to eliminate statistical discrimination. 
Finally, because statistical discrimination is
motivated by a desire to maximize profits, in
order to equalize sA * and sB * banks will have to
hold whites to a higher creditworthiness stan-
dard than minorities (qA * > qB *). That is, to eradi-
cate statistical discrimination, regulators must
give banks a “taste for discrimination” against
white applicants so that banks will have the
incentive to pass up more profitable loans (to
whites) in order to make less profitable ones
(to minorities). Beyond its social and political
implications, such a policy may be particularly
difficult to implement.
Despite its importance from a policy per-
spective, uncovering the root cause of discrimi-
nation has not been the purpose of existing
research. The reason is that both the statistical
discriminator and the bigot will require a mi-
nority applicant to have a “better” application
than a white applicant in order to be granted a
loan. That is, a finding that sA *< sB * is equally
consistent with both preference-based and sta-
tistical discrimination.
Instead, the difference between taste- and
preference-based discrimination is the fact that
a bigot will require minorities to meet a higher
minimum (inferred) standard of creditworthi-
ness than whites (that is, qA * < qB *), while the
statistical discriminator, because he has no taste
for discrimination, is unwilling to forgo lending
to creditworthy minority applicants and so
holds minorities and whites to the same mini-
mum credit standard (that is, qA * = qB *). 
This fact suggests that conditional and mar-
ginal default rates may help determine the
underlying source of any discrimination in the
mortgage market. In particular, if conditional
default rates are equal across groups, then statis-
tical discrimination is an unlikely explanation
for any discrimination that is uncovered through
denial-rate analyses. On the other hand, if the
conditional default rate of marginal minority
borrowers exceeds that of marginal white bor-
rowers, then bigotry becomes a less likely can-
didate for the root cause of discrimination. 
Alternatively, Craig et al. (1998) propose a
method for distinguishing empirically between
statistical and preference-based discrimination
that uses denial-rate data like those employed
by Munnell et al. Unlike Munnell et al., they
can address this issue because they take advan-
tage of the structure inherent in the underwrit-
ing model developed by Longhofer and Peters
(1999) and discussed here. Because the differ-
ence between statistical discrimination and big-
otry lies in the relationship between qA * and qB *,
the empiricist must be able to reconstruct the
lender’s Bayesian updating process (the under-
writing process) to arrive at each applicant’s
inferred quality, q(s). A finding that minority
applicants are more likely to be rejected than
whites, conditional on q(s), would be consis-
tent with preference-based discrimination. On
the other hand, if the likelihood of being
rejected varies across racial groups controlling
for s, but does not vary after controlling for
each applicant’s q, statistical discrimination is
the more plausible explanation. 
n 19 See Longhofer (1995) for a related discussion.
n 20 Whether this involves the bank’s raising its standard for whites
or lowering it for minorities, however, is a more complicated question.
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IV. Conclusion
We have shown here how the current mort-
gage discrimination debate has suffered
because of inadequate theoretical underpin-
nings. Using a formal model of the underwrit-
ing process developed by Longhofer and Peters
(1999), we are able to define what is meant by
discrimination and to design tests for uncover-
ing such behavior. Furthermore, we are able to
define several different types of default rates
precisely and to explore their implications
under different underlying discriminatory
incentives. Finally, we argue that developing
appropriate policy responses to mortgage mar-
ket discrimination depends crucially on under-
standing its root causes. Using our theoretical
model, we are able to design some tests for
uncovering this crucial information.
The definition of discrimination that arises
out of our model implies that denial rate analy-
ses like those performed by Munnell et al. are
the proper tool for uncovering discrimination.
This should not be interpreted, however, as
suggesting that their results prove the existence
of widespread discrimination in mortgage mar-
kets. Compelling as they are, we share some of
the well-documented concerns about the verac-
ity and interpretation of their results.21  In the
end, more research will be required to confirm
or refute the existence of widespread discrimi-
nation and to understand its causes. 
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